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1 Introduction
Henry Morgenthau Jr., US Secretary of the Treasury during World War II, instructed Walt
Disney to work on an animated movie to make US citizens less reluctant to pay their
income taxes. The result was entitled The New Spirit and features Donald Duck who is,
initially, disinclined to pay income taxes. He then, however, becomes convinced that
“Taxes to beat the Axis” is his patriotic duty and happily pays them. Although innovative
and ground-breaking, the production of The New Spirit is not a unique episode in history.
Indeed, the role of patriotism for fiscal policy during war had been acknowledged in the US
and UK long before World War II.1 Likewise, patriotism has recurrently been invoked to
mobilize citizens for other contributions such as military service (Levi 1997).
Patriotic sentiments usually run strongest during times of war. Nonetheless, patriotism is
unlikely to be important for governments’ (fiscal) policy only in times of war. Indeed, moral
appeals to “patriotic duty” – such as in The New Spirit and its sequel entitled The Spirit
of ’43 – are likely to carry significant weight also in times of peace.2 Moreover, they relate
to a warm glow from paying taxes,3 which is only one manifestation of a possibly close link
between patriotism and personal income taxation. A further potentially important link
between patriotism and taxation – and the focus of the current paper – emerges in an
international context when taking into consideration fiscal competition between countries
and taxpayer mobility. This was already acknowledged by Seligman (1892: 138n):
1On the role of patriotism for war financing in the UK during World War I, see Stamp (1932). Bank et
al. (2008) provide more systematic evidence demonstrating that US tax reforms leading to heavier tax
burdens have often been enacted during wartime. Durand (1917: 905) relates this association between
war and taxes to patriotism: “One can hardly overestimate the effect of patriotic sentiment during war
time as an aid to the fiscal policy of the government. Much heavier taxes can be successfully collected
during war than during peace.”
2For instance, tax-paying as a patriotic duty was also an issue in the presidential campaign 2008 (see, e.g.,
Joe Biden on ABC News, September 22, 2008, and the discussion his statement induced). While the US
is currently at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Biden’s appeal should mainly be seen against the background
of the current financial crisis.
3Harbaugh et al. (2007) found evidence from brain scans that paying taxes in laboratory experiments
causes physiological rewards, and Konrad and Qari (2009) show that patriotism positively affects citizens’
attitudes toward tax compliance.
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It is not always strictly true, as Adam Smith said, that “the proprietor of
stock is properly a citizen of the world, and not attached to any particular
country”. Feelings of patriotism, of local pride, of desire of proximity to friends,
of long custom and old usage sometimes play a considerable role.
To better understand the underlying argument, it is important to define more precisely
what we understand by patriotic sentiments. For many, patriotism has become a
value-laden concept bearing a strong negative connotation; being linked to nationalism and
hostility toward the out-group (e.g., Druckman 1994; Mummendey et al. 2001). This,
however, pertains only to what has been termed “blind”, “unquestioning” patriotism,
which is to be distinguished from “constructive” patriotism (Schatz et al. 1999: 151).
While ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ thus defined often become closely tied in reality,
recent research suggests that, from a theoretical and conceptual point of view, a clear
distinction should be made between the two concepts (see Blank and Schmidt 2003; Huddy
and Khatib 2007, and references therein). The argument above - and that proposed in the
present paper - is based on patriotism understood as “devotion to one’s country” (OED
2003: 2122), and is therefore conceptually distinct from nationalist feelings. In fact, this
love and devotion can – pragmatically – be understood as being linked to an intrinsic
preference for living in one’s native country, compared to living in the diaspora (all else
equal). Patriotism, in other words, is a state of mind that leads individuals to experience a
non-monetary benefit (or “patriotic rent”) from residing in their native country.4 Patriotic
citizens may then be willing to pay higher income taxes in their native land, not only
because of patriotic duty (as Donald Duck in The New Spirit), but also because they have
to pay these taxes in order to reside there. Intuitively, patriotism thus reduces individuals’
propensity to move abroad in response to high marginal taxes and this reduction in the
elasticity of the tax base allows governments to adopt higher levels of taxation.
4This rent can be one of the underpinnings for location preferences such as “home attachment”, which has
been analyzed, e.g., by Mansoorian and Myers (1993). They, however, focus on countries’ incentives for
interregional transfers.
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This paper has two main contributions. First, theoretically, we formalize Seligman’s (1892)
argument about the role of patriotism in the context of fiscal competition, using a simple
median voter framework commonly employed in the public choice literature (Holcombe
1989). Specifically, we develop a model of redistributive taxation in the spirit of Meltzer
and Richard (1981), enhanced by the possibility of international migration. This allows us
to better characterize the exact effects of patriotic feelings in an international context, and
derive empirically testable implications. The model shows that, for countries of equal size,
an increase in patriotism in one country raises the equilibrium tax rate in that country.
The intuition is that patriots’ “patriotic rent” increases their cost of emigration. They
might thus refrain from moving abroad under conditions where they would have done so in
the absence of their patriotism. Countries can “exploit” this by implementing higher taxes
in the equilibrium.5
Second, rather than rely on descriptive evidence (see above), we test this prediction using
the International Social Survey Programme National Identity (2003) study – which
includes information on individuals’ patriotism – and matching this dataset with OECD
data on tax burdens (across 21 countries in the year 2003). The empirical analysis
indicates a strong and robust positive correlation between patriotism and fiscal burdens,
even when controlling for other intervening factors and correcting for possible endogeneity.
This suggests that the higher shadow cost for patriotic citizens relocating abroad does
indeed, as hypothesized by the theory, allow countries to exploit the patriotic feelings of
their population through the tax system.
Our analysis contributes to several strands of research. First, a literature starting with
Meltzer and Richard (1981) identifies determinants of the amount of redistribution. While
Meltzer and Richard (1981) themselves highlight that the efficiency costs of taxation may
limit redistribution, later studies in the public choice and political economics tradition
5Complementary theoretical analyses linking taxation and “home attachment” can be found in Ogura (2006)
for capital income taxes, and Konrad (2008) for labor income taxes.
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illustrate that redistribution may be affected by the modes of redistribution available
(Lizzeri and Persico 2001), uncertainty and perceptions about social mobility during
individuals’ lifetime or across generations (Glazer and Konrad 1994; Piketty 1995; Benabou
and Ok 2001; Dorsch 2010), the role of redistribution as insurance (Sinn 1995; Moene and
Wallerstein 2001), specificity and portability of skills (Iversen and Soskice 2001),
demography (Razin et al. 2002), non-monotonicity (Epple and Romano 1996), the existence
of power coalitions (Breyer and Ursprung 1998; Iversen and Soskice 2006), proportional
representation in political decision making (Austen-Smith 2000; Aidt and Dallal 2008) or
the amount of mobilization and political engagement (Solt 2008). Our paper adds the role
of patriotism to this list: i.e., patriotism may affect the ability of governments to extract
tax revenue and to use that revenue for redistribution in a globalized world.
We also add a new aspect to the discussion about the future of the welfare state and
redistribution in an international context. Rodrik (1998) argued that welfare state
institutions may become more important as countries become more open in a globalizing
world (for some recent evidence on the connection between globalization and social
spending, see, e.g., Dreher et al. 2008; Potrafke 2009). But, at the same time, policy
makers and economists are concerned that migration and international tax competition
may erode the financial basis for governmental policy (Weck-Hannemann 2001). That is,
while from a welfare point of view mobility has upsides and downsides,6 high mobility of
highly skilled, high-income earners is likely to have detrimental effects on the amount of
fiscal revenue that is available for redistribution (e.g., Feld 2000).7 In line with Seligman’s
6Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973) and Bhagwati (1976) argued more than 30 years ago that “brain drain”
endangers the countries from which this drain originates and argued for a coordinated corrective tax.
Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) maintain that mobility of skilled labor may deprive a country of
the fruits of public educational investment (thus leading to underinvestment in public education). To
the contrary, Andersson and Konrad (2003) point out that the outmigration threat may overcome the
problem of time-consistent taxation of the returns to private investment in education. Wildasin (2000) –
combining both views – claims that international migration can be good or bad for educational investment,
depending on the public or private nature of education financing.
7This concern has been raised first in the context of capital income taxation. For overviews of this vast
literature, see Wilson (1999), Fuest et al. (2005) and Sørensen (2007).
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(1892) pioneering conjecture, we argue that patriotism, and the attachment it generates to
home, might help prevent a possible “race to the bottom”. Intuitively, patriotism generates
a base of loyal citizens that makes the tax base less elastic with respect to tax rate changes,
and this leads to a tax competition equilibrium in which taxes may remain high.8
Thirdly, our paper links closely to recent attention given to the impact of social identities
on economic decision-making (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Shayo 2009; Klor and Shayo
2010). While - in line with the approach taken in this literature - social identities enter
additively to an individual’s utility function in our theoretical model, we add a new
dimension to this research field by regarding how specific social identities may affect
individuals’ migration decisions in an international setting - and how this, in turn, affects
governments’ taxation decisions.
Finally, while pointing out a potential fiscal benefit of patriotism, our analysis does not
intend to promote a naïve theory of “patriotism is beautiful”. This would clearly ignore all
negative side-effects of patriotic sentiments. Rather, our analysis provides a word of
caution: the Treasury’s inherent interest in having patriotic subjects as taxpayers may well
strengthen the political push for patriotism - certainly in a world of highly mobile
taxpayers and the downward pressure competition for these mobile taxpayers puts on
government revenues. Hence, current increases in international mobility may presage
further attempts by some countries to strengthen patriotism to levels higher than they
would have been in the absence of this fiscal effect.
In the next section the formal framework is outlined. Then, in section 3, we turn to the
empirical evaluation of the core predictions about the link between patriotism and
8Apart from patriotism and the citizen loyalty it may generate, other elements that cause countervailing
forces to the race to the bottom have been identified in theoretical work. Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
focus on agglomeration advantages. Hohaus, Konrad and Thum (1994) and Zissimos and Wooders (2008)
consider aspects of heterogeneity and product differentiation. Our empirical test is independent of these
other factors.
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taxation. Finally, section 4 brings together the main conclusions and discusses some
implications of our findings.
2 The formal framework
We consider a static9 game with migration followed by taxation and redistribution.
Suppose there are two countries, A and B. Each country has two political parties denoted
as DK and RK , for K ∈ {A,B}. The sets of individuals born in countries A and B are
IA = [0, 1 + nA] and IB = [0, 1 + nB]. In each country, a subset [0, 1] of individuals has low
productivity, implying that they earn an income equal to wL. The remaining individuals
are more productive, and earn a gross income equal to wH > wL. The sizes of the group of
individuals with high productivity born in A and B are nA < 1/2 and nB < 1/2,
respectively. The incomes wL and wH are exogenous and fixed, reflecting, for instance,
individuals’ marginal productivity in a competitive labor market with constant returns.10
Individuals also differ in terms of their patriotism: each individual obtains a particular
(non-monetary) pleasure from residing in his/her native country, compared to living in the
respective other country.11 For an individual i born in country K, this pleasure is denoted
9Our framework could be embedded into a fully dynamic multi-period supergame with the two-stage game
considered here being played in each period: i.e., migration choices followed by taxation choices in each
of the periods, with individuals and parties who have an infinite life and maximize discounted present
values (or an overlapping generations structure). In the absence of migration costs, the equilibrium we
derive below for the static game is also an equilibrium in such a finitely or infinitely repeated game. If
there was an infinite number of periods, equilibria other than the one we derive can be supported (e.g.,
by trigger strategies), and the uniqueness result we have would be lost.
10We could make wL and wH a function of relative scarcity of types, or of other factors of production (such
as capital) in the two countries. We refrain from doing so, however, as this would significantly complicate
the analysis without affecting our main conclusions.
11One might argue that non-natives may over time develop patriotism toward their new home-country.
This is not captured here. This need not be problematic as the destination country moved into is less
likely to “re-socialize” individuals into feeling patriotic about it when these individuals’ identities and
loyalties are firmly established in the native country (Hooghe 2005; Johnston 2005). Given that scholars
studying identity formation and the internalization of norms and loyalties generally agree that “agents’
first and most intensive period of socialization occurs inside the main institutions of state socialization
(for example, education systems)” (Johnston 2005: 1026), the development of patriotic feelings may be
more difficult for immigrants. This holds especially for those who have spent considerable time in their
native country (as relative length of embeddedness within both structures is crucial; see Egeberg 2004).
7
as hK + ηi. It consists of a deterministic and a stochastic component. The deterministic
component hK ≥ 0 measures the happiness individuals enjoy on average from residing in
their native country, and we refer to values hA and hB as the average patriotism rent. This
rent does not need to be the same across both countries. The stochastic component, ηi, is
an independent draw from the same distribution for all individuals. We assume that
E(ηi) = 0, and that the distribution is characterized by a cumulative distribution function
G(ηi) that is continuous on its whole support - given by [−(wH + max{hA, hB}), wH ] - and
continuously differentiable on this interval.12
In Stage 1, individuals choose whether to stay in their country of origin or to migrate to
the other country. Simplifying, we assume that individuals with low income are immobile,
and individuals with high income are perfectly mobile in this stage.13 The sets JA and JB
with measures 1 + γA and 1 + γB describe the post-migration distribution of individuals.
Here, γA ∈ [0, nA + nB] is the size of the population of high income earners who choose to
reside in country A, and similarly for γB. As there is no other place to go to or to come
from, it must be that γA + γB = nA + nB. These population sizes are observed at the end
of stage 1. Moreover, individuals lose their mobility at the end of this stage.14
In Stage 2, a political equilibrium determines taxes and redistribution. The timing with
taxation following the migration choices maps the idea that migration decisions are “more
long-term” than taxation, but is not essential for the qualitative predictions here. In each
Our assumption might be inappropriate if the country of origin is authoritarian or a “failed state”. Such
countries are not included in the empirical analysis.
12The random element induces a smooth distribution of patriotism rents, similar to the distribution of
home-attachment in Mansoorian and Myers (1993).
13The assumption that migration is an option only for high income earners is common in the literature –
see, for example, Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Beine et al. (2008) – and builds on findings by,
among others, Docquier and Marfouk (2006), that highly educated workers are five to ten times more
likely to emigrate. Note also that “welfare tourism” – i.e., migration by the poor for welfare benefits – is
probably of only minor concern in the international context analyzed here, as transfer entitlements can
be tied to how long a person has resided in the country.
14Mobility is often higher in earlier stages of life (e.g., when deciding where to study or at the beginning
of one’s professional career) and, due to high set-up costs, is a more “long-term” decision compared to
taxation (which is adjusted more frequently). Similar timing regarding migration and policy choices is
adopted, for instance, in Mitsui and Sato (2001).
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country (K ∈ {A,B}) both parties – DK and RK – choose policy platforms (tK , SHK , SLK)
consisting of a proportional tax rate tK ∈ [0, 1] that applies uniformly to all inhabitants,
and non-negative subsidies SHK ≥ 0 and SLK ≥ 0, where SHK and SLK are the amounts paid to
high and low productivity residents respectively. We allow for different per-capita
subsidies for the two different types of individuals, but require that all individuals with the
same gross income receive the same per-capita subsidy. The proposed policy platform has
to obey a government budget constraint. Given that gross tax revenue in country K is
given by (wL + γKwH)tK and tax collection has a cost equal to t
2
K
2 (wL + γKwH), net tax
revenue TK that is available for redistribution is15
TK = (tK − t
2
K
2 )(wL + γKwH). (1)
Hence, a balanced government budget requires
SLK + SHKγK = (tK −
t2K
2 )(wL + γKwH). (2)
Voters observe the policy platform choices of the parties and vote for one or the other
platform. We assume sincere voting. The platform that receives the most votes is
implemented. In case of a draw, a random device decides on implementation. Once these
decisions are made, income accrues, taxes are collected, tax revenue is redistributed
according to the policy platform and the game ends.
We now turn to the payoffs of the players. Individuals care about the sum of net income
and patriotic rents. The net income of an individual locating in country K is
(1− tK)wL + SLK if the income of the individual is wL, and (1− tK)wH + SHK if the
15The cost of taxation may have many possible microeconomic underpinnings. In the simplest case, the cost
of taxation may be the physical transaction cost of tax collection or tax compliance. Still, it could also
be seen as a shortcut that accounts for an excess burden of taxation. The convexity of this cost in the
tax rate is a common and plausible assumption used to describe the excess burden of taxes (e.g., Bolton
and Roland 1996: 100).
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individual’s income is wH . An individual i born in country A and staying in this country
receives in addition a patriotic rent equal to the sum of the deterministic average
patriotism rent hA, and the idiosyncratic component ηi. Note that the overall patriotic rent
for i can be negative in country A even though hA ≥ 0 if the idiosyncratic component ηi is
sufficiently negative. If the individual i is born in A and moves to B, the patriotism rent
received is zero. This is a normalization and adopted without loss of generality.16 The
intrinsic patriotic rent for an individual i who is born in B and stays in B is defined
analogously as hB + ηi. Summarizing, the payoff of an individual i with high income wH ,
born in country A (i ∈ IA) is
ui = (1− tA)wH + SHA + hA + ηi if i stays in A
ui = (1− tB)wH + SHB if i moves to B.
(3)
The payoff for individuals born in country B is defined analogously. The payoff of
individuals with low income in country K is
ui = (1− tK)wL + SLK + hK + ηi. (4)
As individuals with low productivity do not have a residence choice here, they always stay
in the country where they were born. They may have a positive or negative patriotic rent
from this.
Finally, we assume that all political parties are office motivated. Each party chooses the
policy platform that, given the anticipated choice by the competing party in the same
country, maximizes the probability of winning a majority of votes. As the median voter
theorem will apply in our framework, it is well known that a large class of alternative party
16For instance, the patriotic rents for living in countries A and B could be hA + αi and βi, respectively,
for an individual i born in country A, with stochastic αi and βi. In this case, ηi can simply be seen as
ηi = αi − βi. The absolute levels of αi and βi matter for happiness, but the difference is all that matters
for the migration decision.
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preferences would lead to the same voting equilibrium in stage 2. Solving for the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game, we find two main results.
Proposition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium exists and is unique.
A proof is in the appendix. Intuitively, the groups with low productivity choose their
optimal income tax rates in each of the two countries. They take into consideration that
the share of highly productive individuals in their own country is decreasing in the tax rate
in their own, and increasing in the tax rate of the other country. This causes a unique
crossing of the reaction functions. Patriotism, and the home attachment (or “lock-in”) it
creates, typically leads to strictly positive taxes in the equilibrium. Patriotism weakens the
“race to the bottom” in competitive tax setting between countries.
The comparative static properties of this equilibrium yield the main hypothesis of our
empirical analysis:
Proposition 2 Greater patriotism in a country yields a higher equilibrium tax rate in this
country and a lower equilibrium tax rate in the other country (i.e., dtA
dhA
> 0,
dtB
dhB
> 0, dtA
dhB
< 0 and dtB
dhA
< 0).
A proof of Proposition 2 is also in the appendix. If country A initially has an indigenous
population that is more patriotic on average than the population in country B (i.e.,
hA > hB), then, for identical tax rates (i.e., tA = tB), the mobile high income earners in A
are less likely to emigrate than the mobile high income earners from country B. Country A
thus ends up with a larger set of high income earners in the post-migration equilibrium
than country B (γA > γB). For the median voter in A, this makes a higher tax rate more
desirable than in B. This higher tax has general equilibrium repercussions. As shown in
the proof of the proposition, these repercussions are weaker than the primary effect.
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Proposition 2 yields our main empirical hypothesis: more patriotism triggers higher tax
rates.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we exploit data from the 2003 ISSP “National Identity II” survey and the
OECD “Benefits and Wages ” database to test our main hypothesis (for a set of 21
countries in the year 2003).17 The central dependent and independent variables (i.e., tax
burden and patriotism respectively) are described in section 3.1, while the empirical
approach (and the two levels of aggregation at which we evaluate our central hypothesis) is
explained in section 3.2. The ‘baseline’ results are presented in section 3.3, while section
3.4 discusses potential endogeneity issues.
3.1 Data
The dependent variable, Taxi,j, is defined as gross income minus net income, divided by
gross income. As such, it quantifies the income tax burden as the share of gross income
paid in income taxes and social security contributions. It is calculated by linking the
income level each respondent in the 2003 ISSP survey claims to earn to the income tax rate
data in the OECD “Benefits and Wages” study. The latter study provides information on
workers’ income tax payments as well as social security contributions levied on employees
17The countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West-)Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The ISSP aims to provide a nationally
representative sample of roughly 800 to 1500 respondents in each of these countries (thus providing
about 22300 observations as a starting point). Note that the battery of patriotism questions employed
in our analysis is available only in the ISSP National Identity surveys conducted in 1995 and 2003, as
well as in the corresponding GSS (USA only) and ALLBUS (Germany only) studies. The 1995 income
data in the ISSP and the OECD are, however, not sufficiently detailed to allow a reasonable number of
observations for this year - leaving us with a single cross-section.
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for several benchmark cases depending on household type and income level. More
specifically, information regarding the overall income tax burden is provided for 200 levels
of income (ranging from 0% to 200% of the average employee’s income) for each of the
countries surveyed.18 This thus provides a relatively detailed description of the income tax
burden along the income scale, allowing us to match each respondent closely to the tax
burden calculated by the OECD for his/her income group and household type.
We restrict our sample to those 7427 respondents in the ISSP dataset who are single (note,
though, that only 3090 of these provide sufficient information about income and patriotic
sentiments), and this for two reasons. First, the ISSP data do not allow a clear portrait of
how multi-individual households are constituted (e.g., whether adults in a given household
are married, cohabiting, live with their (grand)parents or children is difficult to establish
with certainty). This information, however, is crucial to accurately determine the
appropriate tax rates in the OECD data, and thus to derive our central tax burden
variable. Second, singles are likely to be more mobile and less attached to a country for
personal reasons (e.g., married individuals, or individuals taking care of children and/or
(grand)parents are more strongly bound to a given country and might ‘grow’ to love it
because of that). Singles thus constitute a ‘least-likely’ category of individuals vulnerable
to exploitation by a national government for patriotic reasons, providing a harsh test for
structural effects.
We also - for the time being - exclude 1309 respondents claiming an income below 60% of
the average worker’s income in their country (bringing the final sample to about 1700
individuals). This, likewise, has two reasons. First, these citizens often have a net wage
18One could argue that individuals earning the average worker’s income (or even twice that amount) are
not necessarily the “rich and mobile” for which our theoretical model (implicitly) predicts the strongest
effects. Nevertheless, for most countries in our sample, the 90th-percentile of the income distribution
corresponds to approximately 1.5 times the average worker’s income (Atkinson 2008). Exceptions are
Ireland and the US, where the 90th-percentile is at 200% of the average worker’s income (Atkinson 2008).
Hence, we feel confident that most of the income distribution which is of empirical interest to our model is
de facto represented in our sample. We are grateful to Tom Cusack for extensive and fruitful discussions
on this point.
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exceeding the gross wage (leading to a negative tax burden), making it difficult to interpret
their tax “burden”. This lack of tax payments also implies that this group cannot be
exploited by the government through higher income taxation related to their (possible)
patriotism. Second, net income exceeding gross income indicates that these respondents
are likely to be recipients of social welfare benefits. They might prefer higher (income) tax
rates to finance redistribution in their favor and become more attached to their country
due to the receipt of welfare benefits. This, however, entails a reverse causality argument
where high tax rates lead to more patriotism. To prevent this from artificially inflating
support for our hypothesis, we exclude this income group in our ‘baseline’ estimations
(although, importantly, we return to this exclusion below). We chose a cut-off at 60% to
exclude all negative tax burdens from the sample. Still, as this choice is rather arbitrary,
we illustrate that imposing a cut-off at 50% or 70% does not affect our main findings.
The core explanatory variable of our analysis is the respondent’s patriotism (Proudi,j). It
is measured relying on a set of questions in the 2003 ISSP “National Identity II” survey
probing the respondent’s feelings about his/her country: “How proud are you of [country]
in each of the following?” Since this question is specifically asked about the country one
resides in at the time of the survey, we exclude all non-nationals from the dataset. Hence,
we only regard, say, French citizens living in France and exclude people of non-French
nationality interviewed in France. This restriction – which is empirically irrelevant19 –
brings the analysis closer in line with the idea in the theoretical model that non-nationals
(are likely to) lack a “patriotism rent” and generates the most accurate representation of
how citizens of a given country feel about their own country.20 Note also that articulated
patriotism – as measured in surveys – is not necessarily a direct measure of h. Patriotism is
19Indeed, retaining non-nationals in the sample – based on the idea that people living for a certain period of
time in a country that is not their native country may nonetheless develop an attachment to this country
(cf. supra) – does not affect the qualitative findings of our analysis (available upon request).
20Clearly, this does not imply that, say, French citizens need to live in France to be proud of France in certain
respects. Yet, French citizens living abroad are not asked about their native country (i.e. France), but
about the country they reside in.
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sampled among the population that emerges in the post-migration equilibrium. As some
individuals with sufficiently negative idiosyncratic patriotism ηi < 0 will have left the
country in equilibrium, average articulated patriotism among the indigenous population in
the post-migration equilibrium should be higher than the average patriotism among all
individuals who are born and raised in a given country. Nevertheless, for the testable
implications of the formal analysis, this is not a problem.21
The “proudness”-question mentioned above is raised with respect to ten different social,
economic, historical and political characteristics of the country at hand (see Table 1),
leading to the question as which of these is most closely connected with the patriotism rent
from living in one’s native country. Fortunately, there is a natural solution to this problem.
As all ten questions explore one common underlying concept (i.e., patriotic sentiments) and
are measured in common units (i.e. a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from “very
proud” to “not proud at all”), they satisfy the basic criteria for use in a factor analysis (cf.
Kennedy 2005). We therefore combine the answers from all ten questions into a single index
through a factor analysis using the principal-factor method as the technique of extraction
(with orthogonal varimax rotation; see Kaiser 1958).22 The analysis reveals that the data
21More formally, the average patriotism rent among the indigenous population in the post-migration
equilibrium is
[hK + E(ηi |i ∈ IK ∩ JK )] > hK for K ∈ {A,B}.
For instance, let nA = nB . Then, for hA > hB , we find that tA > tB in the equilibrium. This means
that, apart from the patriotism rent and in pure income terms, the fiscal conditions in country A for high
income earners are less attractive than in country B. Hence, the cut-off hA+ηi of indigenous individuals
who stay in A is higher than the cut-off hB + ηi for indigenous individuals in B. Accordingly, tA > tB
and the differential effects on outmigration in A and in B reinforces the pre-existing differences between
the expected patriotism rents of non-migrants in the two countries from hA − hB to
[hA + E(ηi |IA ∩ JA )]− [hB + E(ηi |IB ∩ JB )] > hA − hB
in the equilibrium. For our estimations, this implies that the coefficient measuring the effect of differences
in actual patriotism will be biased downward. Hence, if actual migration changes the measured patriotism
in the indigenous population of a country, then this effect biases the empirical test against our hypothesis.
22Such an analysis allows efficient consolidation of the information from a “large number of possible
explanatory variables” into one (or, possibly, multiple) composite indicator(s) (Kennedy 2005: 212)
and has been argued to “mitigate the influence of idiosyncratic measurement error within each of the
variables (...) [, thereby maximizing] the likelihood of measuring the underlying concept more precisely”
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can be summarized by one single strong factor (i.e., only one factor had an eigenvalue
larger than one). Using this factor as a measure of proudness becomes the natural choice
for quantifying patriotism. Table 1 shows the results for this first principal factor.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 indicates that it is mainly the first four and the last question which load most
strongly on the extracted underlying component.23 For these five questions, the (rotated)
factor loading lies well above the critical value of 0.35 suggested by Pennings et al. (1999).
The questions regarding scientific and technological achievement as well as armed forces
obtain factor loadings that hover around this critical value, while the remaining three
questions appear to add little to the underlying component. Intuitively it appears
reasonable that these five questions are highly correlated with latent patriotism. For most
people, patriotic feelings or pride in one’s country are more likely to derive from, say,
individuals’ perceptions of the country’s political influence in the world than its
achievement in arts or sports (which may be deemed as more individual, rather than
country-level, achievements). Given the coding scheme of the pride questions the extracted
patriotism variable increases with patriotic feelings. Hence, support for the main
hypothesis would imply a positive coefficient in a regression of tax burden on patriotism.
3.2 Empirical specifications
We evaluate our main hypothesis at two levels of aggregation.
(Coffé and Geys 2005: 490). Note also that the suitability of data for a factor analysis is often measured
via the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (which indicates the proportion of
variance that is common among the variables included in the analysis). The (normalized) index has
values between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating that the data are better suited to factor analysis
(Kaiser 1974; Kaiser and Rice 1974). In our case, the KMO-index obtains a value of 0.864.
23de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) analyze US data (GSS sample) and report as well that these five questions
are strongly correlated with latent patriotism.
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First, and possibly most intuitive, we work at the country level. The idea here is that, to
the extent that taxation decisions in a given country are influenced by the patriotic nature
of its population, the average tax burden should be a reflection of the average level of
patriotism. To assess this prediction, we aggregate the patriotism and income tax burden
variables described in the previous section across all respondents for each of our 21
countries.24 As such, we derive one patriotism-tax burden combination for each country.
As standard regression analysis is unreliable using such a limited number of observations,
we rely on a simple graphical representation. That is, we depict the average degree of
patriotism (on the horizontal axis) against the tax burden (on the vertical axis) in a simple
cross-plot, and expect a positive relation between both variables. Although this analysis
admittedly does not allow controlling for possible confounding factors, it does present a
general view of the relation between both variables.
Second, we exploit the idea that governments generally impose an overall tax schedule or
tax structure, which affects groups of taxpayers differently depending on their income level
(and socio-economic characteristics). Hence, an alternative test of our theory exploits
aggregates for the 200 different income levels reported in the OECD Benefits and Wages
database. Indeed, to the extent that the government defines (or adjusts) the overall tax
structure (e.g., its progressivity), the observed average tax burden of given income groups
will be a reflection of their average patriotic sentiment. Evidently, we do not imply here
that governments deliberately impose higher taxes on certain income groups depending on
their perceived level of patriotism. Such a link between the incidence of income taxes across
the income distribution with the incidence of patriotism across the income distribution
would be highly implausible. Nonetheless, when more patriotism among high-income
earners reduces their international mobility - as argued above - more progressive forms of
taxation introduced by the government to exploit this will show up in the distribution of
24Other taxes might play a role as well. Still, income taxes might be particularly important (as illustrated
by the choice in The New Spirit to focus on income tax payments). Moreover, we have no information
on other taxes.
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tax burdens across income levels; this provides the cornerstone of our analysis here.
The level of observation in this analysis obviously is no longer the country, but a given
income level within a country. That is, we calculate for all individuals in a given income
category in a given country, the average level of patriotism. For example, we aggregate the
information on all individuals claiming an income between, say, 103.00% and 103.99% of
the average workers’ income in a given country. The maximum number of observations in
the analysis therefore equals the number of countries (21) times the number of income
classes (200). However, our sample does not include respondents for all income levels in
each country, and the final sample reduces to about 280 observations. As this allows for
reliable inference from standard regression estimation techniques, we test our central
hypothesis by estimating a regression equation of the following form:
Taxi,j = β0 + β1Proudi,j + x′i,jβ2 + ei,j (5)
where Taxi,j represents the average income tax burden faced by income group i in country
j, Proudi,j denotes income group i’s average level of patriotism and x′i,j is a vector of
control variables. Essentially, this approach thus exploits the cross-country variation in
patriotism for different income brackets (while, as discussed below, controlling for these
income brackets in themselves).
Beside the central patriotism variable described in the previous section (aggregated at the
income group level), we add a number of control variables to capture the effect of potential
mediating factors. First of all, we include each income group i’s position in the income
distribution of his/her country (IncPosi,j). This designates the percentage of country j’s
average wage that this income group i represents. Hence, as the OECD provides detailed
data for 200 income levels (see above), IncPosi,j ranges from 0% to 200%. The coefficient
estimate is expected to be positive, as higher income leads to higher tax burdens. Further,
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we control for a number of country characteristics. First, the country’s unemployment rate
(Unemj) is taken from the World Development Indicators. Unemployment increases the
need for public spending on unemployment (and, potentially, other social welfare) benefits,
and thus is likely to be associated with higher equilibrium tax rates. We include the level
of GDP (per capita and in natural logarithms to account for the highly skewed distribution
of this variable; GDPj). Following Wagner’s Law, we expect that the wealth of a country is
associated with higher taxes. Inclusion of this variable is also important to account for the
relative sizes of countries. We also account for the ideological persuasion of the government
(IDEOj) based on the oft-cited idea that left-wing parties favor more government
intervention and redistribution than their right-wing counterparts, which is likely to lead to
higher tax burdens (e.g., Hibbs 1977). The variable IDEOj is obtained from the
Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2008) and takes on values between 1 and
5, with larger numbers representing more leftist governments. As governments are unable
immediately to change fiscal policies to match their ideological preferences, we lag this
variable by four years (due to the strong temporal dependence in the series; using slightly
shorter or longer lags makes little difference to our findings). Given the coding scheme, we
expect this variable to be positively related to the income tax burden. Fourth, we include
an index of fiscal decentralization (DECENTRj), measured as the share of total
government revenues raised at the national level (likewise taken from the Comparative
Political Dataset; Armingeon et al. 2008). The idea here is that if public good provision is
decentralized and lower-level governments are fiscally autonomous, the central government
itself is in less need of financial resources, allowing income tax rates to be lower.25
Before we turn to the results, it is important to note that, although our dataset pools
25Note that we also evaluated our model at one further level of disaggregation: namely, the individual level.
As before, this does not imply that tax legislation needs to target specific individuals depending on their
level of patriotism, but rather exploits the idea that when patriotism affects the shape of the overall tax
structure, it will affect each individual’s tax payment. The results - available upon request - support those
of the more aggregated analyses: i.e., the tax structure underlying individuals’ tax burdens is designed
(indirectly) to extract patriotic rents.
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cross-sections from different countries, we do not include country fixed effects in our
estimations. To include country fixed effects would lead to a focus on within-country
variation, whereas our model predicts that variation in patriotism is associated with
between-country tax differentials (controlling for other factors). Since we use various
country variables to control for obvious level differences in the country-specific tax
schedules in our sample, one might consider clustering the standard errors at the country
level to control for unobserved country characteristics. However, Hubert-White type
standard-errors for country-level clusters are inappropriate in our setting, as that correction
requires a large number of clusters with relatively few observations in each cluster.26 Our
sample is characterized by the opposite tendency: few clusters with numerous observations.
3.3 Results
The results of the country-level analysis are represented in figure 1,
[Figure 1 about here.]
where we show the average degree of patriotism in a given country on the horizontal axis
and place the average tax burden of respondents from that country on the vertical axis.
We also add a trend-line to the picture to clarify the overall relation between both
variables. This simple cross-plot clearly confirms the expected positive relation between the
level of patriotism and the level of taxation. Countries where respondents report more
pride in their country (i.e., patriotic sentiment) are also those countries that, on average,
tend to impose heavier tax burdens on their inhabitants.
26See Wooldridge (2003) and the references therein for studies showing that cluster-robust estimation may
fail even when the number of clusters is as large as 40 or 50.
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Shifting the analysis to a lower level of aggregation and concentrating on the
patriotism-taxation relation using data on 200 income-groups, we find the results presented
in Table 2. The first column regresses income group i’s tax burden on its patriotism score
(Aver. Proud) controlling only for the relative income position (IncPos).27 The second
column adds controls for various country characteristics. The remaining three columns
have two purposes. First, by varying the cut-off point for dropping low-income earners, we
evaluate the robustness of our findings to this particular choice. Hence, in columns (4) and
(5), we report some results using a cut-off of 50% and 70% (rather than 60%, as in the
main estimations). Second, varying this cut-off point also allows an empirical assessment of
whether the patriotism effect in our dataset is particularly strong for high income groups
and/or particularly weak for low income groups (see above). To this end, in column (3), we
also add results using only those respondents to the ISSP survey who claim to earn less
than 60% of the average worker’s income. For these low income people, the theory predicts
no relation between patriotism and the tax burden (though, as mentioned, there may be a
reverse causality problem here leading to a spurious positive relationship between the two
variables; see section 3.1). Hence, comparing columns (2), (3), (4) and (5), we can
determine whether the positive association between patriotism and tax burden is stronger
for the upper part of the income distribution.
[Table 2 about here.]
Starting discussion of our findings with a brief description of the control variables, we find
that – as expected – income groups placed relatively higher in the country’s income
distribution face a significantly heavier tax burden. Also, in line with the proposition that
left-wing governments favor intervention more highly, the tax burden is higher when the
government’s ideological position (four years ago) was further to the left. The extent of
fiscal decentralization, on the other hand, is linked to a lower income tax burden
27Using non-linear forms of individuals’ relative income positions does not affect our findings.
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(supporting the idea that central governments in such a setting need fewer resources from,
among others, income taxation). GDP and unemployment show the expected positive
relation to the tax burden, but remain statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
Turning to our central patriotism variable, we find strong and consistent support for our
main proposition. The estimations (columns (1)-(2) in Table 2) show that patriotism is
positively associated with the income tax burden, even after controlling for relative income
positions. The point estimates are very similar in both baseline estimations, indicating that
this result is robust to adding additional country-level explanatory variables. This evidence
is strongly in line with the theoretical hypothesis. It suggests that countries are able to
exploit the patriotic feelings of their populations by levying higher taxes. Remember,
moreover, that our findings are based only on individuals who are single (whose propensity
to move arguably is greatest) and that actual migration biases the empirical test against
our hypothesis (see above). Hence, our estimates could be seen as a conservative estimate
of the true effect.
The remaining columns in Table 2 furthermore illustrate that our findings are robust to the
cut-off we employ for including low-income earners in the dataset. Moreover, the patriotism
variable has a positive sign, but fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels,
in the model using only the low-income subsample of our population (i.e., 192
observations). This supports the theoretical prediction that for these low income people no
relation between patriotism and the tax burden exists (despite a potential reverse causality
problem that would inflate the positive relationship between the two variables).
3.4 Robustness analysis: Reverse causality?
A high (income) tax burden may correspond to extensive (or high-quality) public goods
provision, which might lead citizens to like their country better and, hence, to be more
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patriotic. While such a reverse-causality argument may hold regarding questions about
pride in certain aspects of their country (such as the social security system or fair and equal
treatment of individuals), it is much harder to maintain for other proudness questions (such
as a country’s economic achievements or political influence in the world). Nonetheless, this
section takes this potential reverse causality argument seriously and employs an
instrumental variables (IV) approach to evaluate to what extent it might affect our results.
Finding a suitable instrument for patriotism is not straightforward. One could think of
medals won in Olympic Games or victories in wars, but while the former caters only to one
very specific aspect of possible patriotic sentiment (and one that does not appear to matter
very much in our data, cf. Table 1), the latter is hard to operationalize (especially as most
countries in our sample have not experienced any major conflicts since WWII; and even in
that global conflict winners and losers are sometimes hard to determine accurately). We
instrument our measure of patriotism with the country’s number of neighbors. This builds
on the idea that citizens of countries with fewer neighbors might be less susceptible to
patriotic feelings (while there is, a priori, no reason to believe that the number of neighbors
is related to tax burdens). This would follow from social identity and self-categorization
theory’s notion that social identification not only involves being part of a given social group
(i.e., one’s nation), but also that there is an “outgroup” one can differentiate or distance
oneself from (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987; Shayo 2009). The presence of
more different outgroups might therefore strengthen attachment or commitment to the own
group. The coefficient estimate for this instrument in the first stage regressions is precisely
estimated and statistically different from zero at the 5 % level (see column (2) of Table 3).
Its sign suggests that a larger number of bordering countries is indeed associated with more
patriotism. Column (1) of Table 3 shows the results from the second-stage regressions.
[Table 3 about here.]
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The results reveal that the relation between patriotism and tax burdens remains
qualitatively similar. That is, the coefficient estimate retains its positive sign and
statistical significance at conventional levels. While the estimated coefficient of patriotism
becomes larger (suggesting there is some downward bias in the OLS estimations), the IV
estimations confirm the results presented in the baseline estimation.28
4 Conclusion
There is by now an extensive literature on nationalist movements and national identities.
While, as argued above, nationalism and patriotism should be clearly distinguished, this
literature is interesting nonetheless as it has brought forward a wide range of arguments as
to why such identities develop (or are developed). These include cultivation of the identity
for itself (e.g., Anderson 1991) or to delineate the boundaries of the nation as autonomous
and distinguishable relative to others (e.g., Prizel 1998). Our analysis suggests one further
reason to develop such identities, or, at least, an important side-effect of developing such
identities: to provide a supportive base for the welfare state and intra-state redistribution.
Piecemeal evidence on a number of countries suggests that countries indeed actively use
their education system for teaching their young generations patriotism and for incubating
emotions and values such as “loving your own country”.29 Of course, such policies may be
28Further robustness checks with respect to the measurement of the dependent variable, the importance of
specific countries as well as an analysis at the individual (see also footnote 25) were also performed. Our
results are robust to such alternative specifications (see Qari et al. 2009 for details).
29There are a number of examples. Newspaper reports some years back show that educational reforms have
been discussed or implemented in Japan (The Economist 19/12/06) and Poland (Neue Züricher Zeitung,
11/6/2006), by which patriotism receives more emphasis at school. Maosen (1990) reports that inculcating
patriotism was and is an aim of the education policy in China both in imperial and communist times up
to today. In the former German Democratic Republic, “loving the German Democratic Republic” was the
first law for their youth organizations. Even democratic countries like the United States have a tradition
of instilling patriotism at an early stage of life. An example for this is the Boy Scouts Charter (chapter
3) which states that “...to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance and kindred virtues, using the
methods which are now in common use by BoyScouts” comprise one of its main educational objectives.
See also Lott (1990) who argues that instilling political views is one reason for the public provision of
schooling.
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pursued for many purposes. We have shown that, once these preferences exist, they can be,
and seemingly are, instrumentalized for fiscal policy.
We do not intend to ignore the (possibly numerous) negative side-effects of patriotic
sentiments, and we do not promote a naïve theory of “patriotism is beautiful”. Hence, the
policy implication of our findings is not to say: ‘let’s make our children good patriots’.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the Treasury’s inherent interest in having
patriotic subjects as taxpayers may make the political push for patriotism in a country
stronger than it would be without this fiscal effect. That is, there might exist an ‘unholy
alliance’ between the “Chauvinists” in a country and those who would like to stabilize tax
revenue in a world of growing mobility (and tax competition).30 Whether or not patriotism
is, overall, a rather undesirable and dangerous feeling, our findings help understand certain
developments in various countries’ national educational policies (both along the historical
dimension and across different types of governance regimes; see above). Further, they
suggest that current increases in international mobility, downward pressures on government
revenues, and governments’ greater needs for funding of the welfare state in a globalized
world (or simply revenues needed to service increased government debt) make the fiscal
motivation to invest in patriotism more important. This suggests that we might well
observe a further strengthening of patriotism/nationalism.
30Evidently, alternative strategies can be imagined through which governments can fight tax base flight
and/or tax cheating. Krishna and Slemrod (2003), for example, point to the importance of tax system
marketing in this respect. Moreover, from a long-run perspective, attracting highly qualified foreign
workers may be as important for fiscal purposes as the ability to keep inhabitants as citizens at home by
investing in patriotism. Though reasonably beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting for
future analyses to test such hypotheses.
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Appendix
We prove Propositions 1 and 2 in this Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. We turn to an analysis of subgame perfect equilibrium and
solve by backward induction. Consider Stage 2. At this stage (γA, γB) is given. For given
γK in country K, the voting game has a unique Condorcet winner with SHK = 0,
SLK = TK(t∗K) and
t∗K(γK) = γK
wH
wL + γKwH
. (6)
To confirm this, first note that the individuals with low income constitute a majority and
have the same preferences regarding combinations of (tK , SLK , SHK ).31 For any given tK ,
individuals with low productivity prefer the smallest possible transfer to individuals with
high productivity. Hence, SHk = 0 and SLK = TK(tK) describes their most preferred transfers
31Recall that we assume nA + nB < 1. If nA + nB > 1, self-sorting may occur in the equilibrium in the
simple framework chosen here. Similarly, if the low income individuals can also migrate, the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium may become an issue. However, our assumptions match well with a more
general, but more cumbersome, framework in which the migration costs of individuals are drawn from a
random distribution. In such a setting, only a few high income earners will be fully mobile, while many
have intermediate, high or even prohibitive costs of migration. If so, the median voter in both countries
has low income, which is what is really needed for the qualitative results we find.
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for any given tax rate.32 Moreover, it can be confirmed that (6) is the unique maximum of
ui = (1− tK)wL + (tK − t
2
K
2 )(wL + γKwH) + hK + ηi (7)
and that t∗K(γK) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, (tK , SLK , SHK ) = (t∗K(γK), TK(t∗K), 0) constitutes the unique
equilibrium in stage 2 in each country.
Turning to Stage 1, now consider migration choices. Individuals anticipate the shares of
highly productive individuals in the migration equilibrium and the tax rates (6) that are
induced by these shares. The payoff to a highly productive individual that chooses to
reside in country K is
uH =

(1− γK wHwL+γKwH )wH + hK + ηi if i ∈ IK
(1− γK wHwL+γKwH )wH if i /∈ IK
. (8)
The payoffs in the two lines of (8) refer to whether i was born in K or not. An individual i
born in A will stay in A if (1− γA wHwL+γAwH )wH + hA + ηi > (1− γB
wH
wL+γBwH )wH . This
condition can be solved for the critical ηi that makes i indifferent between staying and
moving, which is denoted as
ηA ≡ (γA wH
wL + γAwH
− γB wH
wL + γBwH
)wH − hA. (9)
Accordingly, assuming subgame perfect equilibrium play, the set of highly productive
individuals who are born in A and migrate to B is
nAG(∆twH − hA), with ∆t ≡ γA wH
wL + γAwH
− γB wH
wL + γBwH
. (10)
32We require uniform treatment of all individuals regarding the tax rate, and uniform redistribution among
groups that are homogeneous regarding their productivities or skills. As is known from Epple and Romano
(1996) and the work they inspired, assumptions about feasible redistribution are important for the types
of redistribution policies that emerge in the equilibrium.
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Recall that G(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the random component η of
patriotism. Similarly, the size of the set of high income earners from B who migrate to A is
nBG((−∆t)wH − hB). (11)
Migration choices based on anticipated taxes hence determine the sizes of the sets of
(post-migration) high income earners in the two countries as
γA = nA (1−G(∆twH − hA)) + nBG((−∆t)wH − hB)
γB = nAG(∆twH − hA) + nB (1−G((−∆t)wH − hB)) .
(12)
Each individual need not consider the change of γA or γB from her own migration choice
here, because each individual has a measure of zero.
For existence of an equilibrium in Proposition 1 note that (6) establishes a one-to-one
relationship between tK and γK . Replacing ∆t with the equilibrium value
(t∗A(γA)− t∗B(γB)) in the subgame perfect equilibrium for given γA and γB turns (12) into a
system of two equations with two unknowns: γA and γB, viz.
γA(γA, γB) =

nA
(
1−G( wLw2H(γA−γB)(wL+γAwH)(wL+γBwH) − hA)
)
+nBG( wLw
2
H(γB−γA)
(wL+γAwH)(wL+γBwH) − hB)
γB(γA, γB) =

nAG( wLw
2
H(γA−γB)
(wL+γAwH)(wL+γBwH) − hA)
+nB
(
1−G( wLw2H(γB−γA)(wL+γAwH)(wL+γBwH) − hB)
)
(13)
The existence and uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium is reduced to the question
of whether this system has a unique solution. To consider this, note that (13) describes a
self-mapping g : Γ→ Γ for
Γ ≡ {(x, y) |x ∈ [0, nA + nB], y ∈ [0, nA + nB], x+ y = nA + nB} (14)
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The pair (γA, γB) ∈ Γ by definition. Moreover, (γA(γA, γB), γB(γA, γB)) ∈ Γ, as
γK(γA, γB) ∈ [0, nA + nB] and γA(γA, γB) + γB(γA, γB) = nA + nB by (13). The mapping g
is continuous (by using the continuity of G). Moreover, Γ as defined in (14) is a compact
and convex set. Hence, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem can be applied to confirm that this
mapping has a fixed point (γ∗A, γ∗B). This fixed point characterizes the post-migration
shares of highly productive individuals in the two countries in an equilibrium.
It remains to confirm that this solution is unique. Note that the functional relationship
γA(γB) in the first equation in (13) determines a slope
dγA
dγB
=
(
nAG
′
A
wLw
2
H
(wL+γBwH)2
+ nBG′B
wLw
2
H
(wL+γBwH)2
)
(
1 + nAG′A
wLw
2
H
(wL+γAwH)2
+ nBG′B
wLw
2
H
(wL+γAwH)2
) , (15)
where
G′A ≡
∂G(η)
∂η
at η = ηA and G′B ≡
∂G(η)
∂η
at η = ηB .
This slope is positive and smaller than 1. Similarly, the second equation reveals a slope dγB
dγA
that is positive throughout but smaller than 1. Accordingly, these two functions can
intersect only once. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (6) to replace γA and γB in (12) yields a system of
equations that determines the equilibrium tax rates as functions of nA, nB, wH , wL, hA, hB
and G(η):
tAwL
wH(1−tA) = nA (1−G((tA − tB)wH − hA)) + nBG((tB − tA)wH − hB)
tBwL
wH(1−tB) = nAG((tA − tB)wH − hA) + nB (1−G((tB − tA)wH − hB))
(16)
The system of equations (16) determines the equilibrium tax rates in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. Totally differentiating (16) with respect to tA, tB, hA and hB yields
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the following system of equations:
 −X − ΩA X
X −X − ΩB

 dtA
dtB
 (17)
= −
 nAG′A−nAG′A
 dhA −
 −nBG′B
nBG
′
B
 dhB,
with
X ≡ nAG′AwH + nBG′BwH > 0
ΩA ≡
∂( tAwL
wH(1−tA)
)
∂tA
= wL
wH(1−tA)2 > 0
ΩB ≡
∂( tBwL
wH(1−tB)
)
∂tB
= wL
wH(1−tB)2 > 0.
(18)
From here, we can analyze the comparative statics. We find that
dtA
dhA
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−(nAG′A) X
nAG
′
A −X − ΩB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−X − ΩA X
X −X − ΩB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(19)
= [(nAG
′
A)(X + ΩB)− nAG′AX]
(X + ΩA)(X + ΩB)−X2
= nAG
′
AΩB
(X + ΩA)(X + ΩB)−X2 > 0
The positive sign is obtained as follows. The denominator is positive, as both X and ΩB
30
are positive, and the numerator is also positive. Similarly,
dtB
dhA
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−X − ΩA (−nAG′A)
X nAG
′
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−X − ΩA X
X −X − ΩB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(20)
= [(nAG
′
A)(−X − ΩA)− (−nAG′A)X]
(X + ΩA)(X + ΩB)−X2
= −nAG
′
AΩA
(X + ΩA)(X + ΩB)−X2 < 0.
Again, the denominator is positive. The numerator is negative, explaining the negative
sign. Given the signs of these expressions, it follows that
d(tA − tB)
dhA
> 0. (21)
As tA = tB in the equilibrium for nA = nB, this completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
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Figures
Figure 1: Tax burden and patriotism across countries
Country codes:
AUS Australia
AUT Austria
CAN Canada
CHE Switzerland
DEU (West-)Germany
DNK Denmark
ESP Spain
FIN Finland
FRA France
GBR United Kingdom
HUN Hungary
IRL Ireland
JPN Japan
KOR (South-)Korea
NZL New Zealand
POL Poland
PRT Portugal
SVK Slovak Reublic
SWE Sweden
USA United States
Tables
Table 1: Patriotism factor analysis (N = 5023)
Rotated Factor Loadings
The way democracy works .68244177
Its political influence in the world .60596827
economic achievements .62622493
Its social security system .62780228
Its scientific and technological achievements .35983848
Its achievements in sports .11578783
Its achievements in the arts and literature .16349948
armed forces .3408436
Its history .15194136
Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society .53190732
Eigenvalue: 2.211
Variance explained: 69.47%
Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
≥ 60% ≥ 60% ≤ 60% ≥ 50% ≥ 70%
IncPos 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0862∗∗∗ 9.056∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0858∗∗∗
(7.62) (9.75) (4.80) (11.30) (8.59)
GDP 0.595 −93.63∗ 0.988 0.382
(0.75) (−2.17) (1.39) (0.38)
Unem 0.0952 0.0988 0.165 0.0621
(0.73) (0.01) (1.41) (0.39)
IDEO 3.182∗∗∗ −6.628 3.153∗∗∗ 3.199∗∗∗
(9.86) (−0.39) (10.51) (9.34)
Decentr −0.0547∗ 2.172 −0.0631∗∗ −0.0602∗
(−2.36) (1.05) (−2.92) (−2.36)
Aver. Proud 3.568∗∗∗ 1.892∗∗ 151.8 1.569∗∗ 1.696∗
(5.35) (3.00) (1.17) (2.60) (2.36)
Constant 19.66∗∗∗ 8.179 421.0 3.316 10.89
(16.85) (0.93) (1.64) (0.42) (0.96)
N 292 282 192 323 243
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: Instrumental Variable Regression Results
(1) (2)
Tax Burden Proud
IncPos 0.00730 0.00169∗
(0.13) (2.41)
GDP −18.22∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(−2.01) (5.83)
Unem 1.517+ −0.0237∗
(1.74) (−2.14)
IDEO 4.057∗∗ −0.0325
(2.95) (−1.49)
Decentr 0.216 −0.00203
(1.24) (−0.80)
Proud 56.20∗
(2.41)
Number of borders 0.0379∗
(2.35)
Constant 170.8∗ −4.002∗∗∗
(2.07) (−4.59)
N 282 282
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
